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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL
ATTEMPT: MARGINAL DETERRENCE
AND THE OPTIMAL STRUCTURE
OF SANCTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION: APPLICATION OF ECONOMICS
TO THE CRIMINAL LAW
Society creates a complex structure of incentives and disincen-
tives influencing individual conduct when it threatens sanctions for
certain behavior.' Conduct tending to increase the risk of social
harm (however defined) is influenced by the probability and severity
of punishment. Criminal actors alter their conduct in response to
changes in their private utility brought about by the likelihood of
suffering sanctions.
What seems at odds with this paradigm is the view that criminal
activity is a coolly calculated event. "Crime" often conjures up
images of socially motivated, irrational acts of violence. In other
words, the traditional images hardly reflect the acts of rational utility
maximizers. 2 Much criticism has been directed toward deterrence
as a primary goal of criminal sanctions for precisely this reason.
3
These criticisms query that if criminals do not calculate their utility
ex ante, then deterrence is an implausible basis for the goal of the
criminal law. Although the continuing debate on the aptness of the
deterrence assumption is beyond the scope of this essay, a few intro-
1 For the purposes of this essay, the terms "crime" and "punishment" refer to their
deterrent capacities. Where possible, corroborating arguments from non-deterrent
based theories are noted.
2 For a discussion of the relevance of realistic assumptions, see R. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977). According to Posner,
[t]he notion of the criminal actor as a rational calculator will strike many readers as
highly unrealistic, especially when applied to criminals having little education or
crimes not committed for pecuniary gain .... [T]he test of a theory is not the real-
ism of its assumptions but its predictive power. A growing empirical literature on
crime has shown that criminals respond to changes in opportunity costs, in the
probability of apprehension, in the severity of punishment, and in other variables as
if they were indeed rational calculators of the economic model.
Id. at 206.
3 See Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime
Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315 (1984). For a general discussion of the perceived limitations of
deterrence theories of crime, see H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
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ductory remarks explaining the rationale of both criminal actors and
their society are in order.
Regardless of the stated agenda of punishment, deterrence, re-
tributivism, or incapacitation, 4 sanctioning certain behavior com-
mits resources which could have been devoted to different
purposes. Thus, an economic aspect arises in allocating scarce re-
sources to achieve desired (and perhaps competing) ends.5
Although criminal actors may be motivated defacto by irrational im-
pulses, society desires to remove rational motivations to commit
crimes. The criminal law must be structured so as to counter any
potential benefits which may rationally motivate anyone to commit a
crime; the criminal law undermines its essential purpose if it induces
rational individuals to commit criminal acts.
6
A society attempting to maximize social utility will try to mini-
mize the social cost imposed by criminal acts. 7 A criminal actor act-
ing out of rational self-interest will try to maximize his private
utility.8 Because the interests of both society and its individual
members can be identified generally, the structure of incentives cre-
ated by the criminal law can be tailored accordingly. Society rejects
incurring greater costs derived from controlling criminal acts than
the acts' harm imposes. Similarly, an individual rejects incurring a
greater cost from committing a criminal act than the potential pri-
vate benefit of its realization. These two general premises generate
meaningful prescriptions for the criminal law.
Crime and punishment create economic problems beyond soci-
ety's allocation of resources. The criminal actor must also make de-
cisions affecting his or her utility.9 An individual engaging in a
given activity naturally forgoes other opportunities. This opportu-
nity cost represents the actor's next best alternative to the chosen
act and marks the minimum utility that a rational actor derives from
the chosen activity; otherwise, the foregone opportunity is the pre-
ferred action.
4 For a discussion of many of the concerns of this paper in a non-deterrent context,
see Grevase, Grading Criminal Attempts-A Proposed Solution for Statutory Reform in Sentencing,
20 RUrGERS L.J. 479 (1989). Grevase incorporates social harm into his analysis but fails
to consider the cost constraints of law enforcement on the optimal level of sanctions.
5 R. EKELUND, MICROECONoMics 5 (2d ed. 1988).
6 This proposition is compatible with retributivist, rehabilitationist, or incapacita-
tionist theories. A structure of criminal law based on any of these theories is seriously
undermined if offenders realize a net gain from criminal activity.
7 See Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1236 (1985) [hereinafter Shavell].
8 Id. at 1235.
9 See id. at 1242.
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Decisions of criminal actors to engage in illegal activities pre-
suppose a field of potential actions. This field includes a wide range
of both legal activities (whose expected costs and benefits are
weighed against that of illegal activities), and other potential, illegal
activities. 10 In other words, the opportunity cost of an actor's activ-
ity is judged against all foregone activities, legal and illegal. That
such decisions occur within the restricted domain of illegal activities
suggests that utility maximizing decisions are made not only at the
initiation of a crime, but also throughout its commission.
Although the economic literature on crime abounds with analy-
ses of the incentives to commit crimes,II few critics notice that such
incentives surface within the crimes themselves. The sphere of
criminal attempt and its deterrents require a structure of incentives
and disincentives sensitive to the shifts in utility that a criminal un-
dergoes during the commission of a crime. These shifts often, but
not always, are accompanied by changes in societal harm.1 2 This
has traditionally been the basis for arguments that sanctions reflect
marginal deterrence.
Marginal deterrence not only is indicated by the level of societal
harm, but also, as I will argue, by the level of individual utility of the
criminal actor. Because this individual level changes as a criminal
attempt is completed, the marginal deterrent value of a scale of
sanctions must be geared to the criminal's utility calculations to be
effective. 1
3
10 That illegal activities are part of an individual's opportunity cost follows from the
notions of proportional sanctions and marginal deterrence. Incentives to choose less,
rather than more, harmful activities often translate into decisions to move from higher
harm imposing crimes to lower ones. See Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, in THE
ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 80 (L. McPheters ed. 1976).
11 For an adumbration of the empirical literature on criminal deterrence, see D.
PYLE, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (1983). See also Ehrlich, Partici-,
pation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, in THE ECONOMICS OF
CRIME AND LAw ENFORCEMENT 141 (L. McPheters ed. 1976).
12 For example, assume that a burglar intends to rob a home safe for the jewelry he
knows to be inside. The offender also burgles the homeowner's expensive and lifesav-
ing medication, which happened to be in the safe as well. Although the taking of the
medicine increases the social harm of the crime, the burglar, unless he holds the
medicine for ransom, does not recognize a gain above and beyond that provided by the
stolen jewels.
13 This comment explores the criminal's utility calculations through an option theory
of crime. This theory treats the attempt stages of a crime as discreet decisions; at each
stage of the attempt, the offender "purchases" a risk option on the probability that the
attempt will be successfully completed. Steven Shavell suggests an alternative approach.
Offenders discount their expected benefits and harms in two stages: (1) the values for
the completed offense; and (2) the values for the attempt. See Shavell, Deterrence and the
Punishment of Attempts (forthcoming in J. LEGAL STUD. June 1990). Shavell has a front-end
loading analysis of deterrence for attempts. By discounting the expected benefit of an
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This comment is divided into three sections, each of which
presents and analyzes the perverse incentive1 4 that arises from the
increasing magnitude of sanctions as a crime progresses toward
completion. The first section expands upon existing economic
models of crime, 15 which focus on the social welfare function and
the criminal's utility function. The social welfare function of society
is assigned variables representing an act's social harm and the costs
of both detection and apprehension. The criminal's utility function
is represented by variables which account for the private benefit of
the act, the likelihood of detection and apprehension, and the pri-
vate cost of the sanction imposed. From these two perspectives, the
optimal level of sanctions can be determined for given acts (at least
relative to one another).'
6
The second section analyzes the model of criminal sanctions
developed in section one as it applies to criminal attempts. Argu-
ments for less severe sanctions for attempts than for completed
crimes are scrutinized, in particular as those arguments make refer-
ence to the effects of marginal deterrence. To achieve the desired
ends of marginal deterrence, sanctions must respond to the supply
side of criminal acts. This section indicates both that criminal utility
and social welfare are discontinuous in criminal attempts, and that
sanctions responding to the criminal's utility achieve more effec-
tively the desired ends of marginal deterrence.
The final section examines the causes of perverse incentives
when sanctions for criminal attempts rise continuously as the crime
progresses toward completion. Because some actors may be in-
duced by the structure of sanctions to complete attempted crimes,
the possibility that a market failure has occurred in the economy of
crime is examined. If the market of crime17 sends socially undesir-
offense by the expected attempt sanctions, the decision to commit an offense is never
recalculated. "[A]fter an individual decides to commit an act, the sanctions will have no
effect on his behavior. Past the point of no return, he may be regarded as an automaton,
who has set into motion forces that either will or will not lead to harm." Id. at 3. In this
essay, I argue that the offender's expected utility is recalculated in response to changing
events during the commission of a crime.
14 The perverse incentive is the rational inducement an offender has to commit a
more harmful, rather than less harmful, act because of the structure of criminal penalties
relative to private benefits.
15 The most famous of these models is presented in Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, in THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 5 (L. McPheters
ed. 1976) [hereinafter Becker].
16 This essay will not address the actual values of optimal sanctions. Rather, it will
indicate the relative positions of optimal sanctions both among and within offenses.
17 A market in crime presupposes a class of crinal actors who provide criminal acts.
Society pays a price to prevent a certain level of criminal activity. Beyond that level,
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able signals to its criminal actors, then a change is needed in the
structure of incentives (sanctions) to correct those signals. A cor-
rection responsive to the criminal's utility may reduce the social cost
of crime through a greater inducement to abandon its attempt.
II. THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF CRIME
Crime raises the level of social cost when persons engaged in
legal activities are harmed by those committing illegal activities.
Thus, when an assault victim is harmed by the assailant, the aggre-
gate apprehension of society increases;' 8 when robbery victims are
harmed by forced transfers, we as a society are harmed by an in-
creased fear of robbery. These psychic penalties from an increase in
the activity level of criminals are often realized in precaution
expenses. 19
The magnitude of social harm from a criminal act is a function
of the type of act committed; acts causing greater social harm are
more sanction-worthy than those which cause less. 20 For example,
murders are more serious to society than robberies, which are more
serious than jaywalking. The decreasing harmfulness of these types
of acts suggests a decreasing level of sanctions and a structure of
sanctions scaled to movements in social harm.
The magnitude of harm resulting from a type of act is offset by
the probability that the particular harm will occur. The expected
social harm of a criminal act (He) reflects the magnitude of harm (H)
multiplied by the probability of its occurrence (Po). We may repre-
sent the foregoing algebraically, as follows:
H = H X P.
Thus, although both a completed robbery and an interrupted at-
tempted robbery share the same values for magnitude of harm, they
may differ greatly in the probability of the actual harm; accordingly,
they yield different values for expected harm.
Sanctioning criminal actors for the harm they impose causes an
overall reduction in expected harm. If the probability of suffering
the sanction is fixed near unity, then its severity can vary to mirror
society consumes criminal acts by not devoting more resources to prevent them. The
supply of criminal acts, and their demand in society, constitute a market of crime.
18 The "fear" factor rises with the activity level of crimes. Society pays a psychic
penalty and will expend resources in order to reduce it.
19 For a discussion of private expenditures to deter crime (e.g., security guards,
alarms, insurance), see Becker, supra note 15, at 43-45.
20 For a discussion of the effects of type-assessment of crimes on the optimal level of
sanctions, see Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deter-
rent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232, 1244 n.45 (1985).
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changes in expected harm. Given the certainty of suffering sanc-
tions, the punishment for robbery ought to be less severe than the
punishment for murder.
Social harm can be reduced initially by ensuring that all
criminals face very stiff sanctions. One resulting drawback is that
robbers may lack a reason not to murder their victims. Individuals
may also avoid legitimate, socially beneficial, marginal activities. 21
Uniformly high sanctions would cause an increase in social harm
(i.e., fewer robbers, but more murderers).
An alternative to fixing probabilities and varying magnitudes of
sanctions is to fix magnitudes and to vary the probabilities of impo-
sition. 22 Magnitudes of sanctions would be set high, as would re-
sources allocated to increasing the likelihood that the offender will
suffer sanctions. For example, murderers have the greatest likeli-
hood of suffering sanction X (as society would more relentlessly
pursue these criminals), while robbers would have a lower
probability of suffering, the same sanction.
Manipulating the probabilities of the imposition of sanctions is,
however, impractical, unfair, and inefficient. First, increases in the
probability of imposing sanctions require very large expenditures.
Second, stiff punishments for minimally harmful acts will be both ad
hoc23 and may deter legitimate marginal activities.
Controlling probabilities of suffering sanctions either by keep-
ing them near unity or varying them in accordance with social harm
is extremely costly. This probability is determined by the resources
expended on detection and apprehension, by the size of enforce-
ment agencies, and by their remunerations. Incorporating detec-
tion/apprehension costs (C)24 into the earlier equation for social
cost yields
He - (H X Po) + C.
21 A very severe penalty will induce people to forgo socially desirable activities at
the borderline of criminal activity. For example, if the penalty for driving more
than 55 m.p.h. were death, people would drive too slowly, or not at all, to avoid an
accidental violation or an erroneous conviction.
R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 207.
22 Posner notes that in pre-nineteenth century England, capital punishment was the
sanction for both serious and non-serious crimes. Because of the lack of an organized
police force, the probability of suffering punishment was quite low. R. POSNER, supra
note 2, at 211.
23 Even if the penalties are not imposed arbitrarily, society accrues very high infor-
mation costs relative to the harm the offense imposes. One can imagine the cost of a
single criminal trial for a parking violation.
24 The term "C" refers to the fixed costs of maintaining enforcement, adjudicative,
and correctional bodies. The variable costs of raising the probability of detection and
apprehension are distinct from these sunk costs.
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The cost of maintaining agencies at such a level may well exceed the
social costs imposed by the crimes.
Although keeping the magnitude of sanctions high requires less
initial investment (because it is legislated), it increases the social
cost of crime. Uniformly high sanctions tend to equate crimes that
impose differing degrees of social harm. Therefore, criminal activ-
ity will shift to more harmful activities. 25 This heightened social
cost is indicated by marginal deterrence; additional costs exist for
moving from less to more harmful activities.
These additional costs associated with high probabilities and
magnitudes of sanctions come from adjudication and incarceration.
If a criminal is likely to face sanctions and the sanctions are severe,
then society must expend greater resources both in processing an
increasing number of crimes and in maintaining incarcerated indi-
viduals.26 Since certain combinations of probabilities and magni-
tudes of sanctions may impose greater social costs than the crimes
they control, an optimally efficient combination of the two exists
where the harm imposed by criminal activity does not exceed the
social cost of its control. This optimal level of sanctions, which al-
lows society to minimize the social costs of crime, is represented as
follows:
M X P, !:<.(H X Po) + C
where M is the magnitude of the sanction and Pi is the probability of
the sanctions being imposed.
2 7
This social welfare cost/benefit analysis only partially deter-
mines the optimal level of criminal sanctions. The probability and
magnitude of sanctions that society imposes on the criminal actor
affects decisions to engage in sanctioned (and non-sanctioned) be-
havior. 28 As a rational society will not wish to incur greater social
25 If an offender realizes a greater gain from a successful kidnapping than from a
successful robbery, then equal penalties for both offenses will cause an increase in the
number of kidnappings.
26 If an offense carries a sanction of 10 years, and a probability of imposition of 0.1,
the expected private cost is 1 year. Alternatively, the sanction can be lowered by 5 years,
and if the probability of facing sanctions is increased to 0.2, then the same deterrent is
achieved. In the first case, less offenders are caught, but are punished more severely. In
the second case, twice as many offenders are caught, but they are punished less severely.
The costs associated with the second instance are much greater because twice as many
offenders are processed through the justice system.
27 The magnitude of the sanction [Al], and the cost ofjuridical/carceral institutions
[C] are related endogenously. Increasing magnitudes of sanctions involve longer prison
terms, which raise the resource costs of these institutions.
28 The effects of the structure of penalties on an offender's behavior are part of his
opportunity costs. Costs which make an offense less attractive than the offender's next
best alternative will deter the commission of that offense.
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costs from preventing crime than those imposed by the commission
of those crimes, so too will individual actors not wish to incur
greater harm from an activity than the private benefits derived from
that activity.
There are two aspects involved in the determination of the
magnitude of private benefit that a criminal derives from commit-
ting an offense. The first involves benefits easily quantifiable.2 9 For
example, in a robbery, the benefit is the market value of the stolen
goods. The second aspect is the psychic benefit (or penalty) arising
from commission of the act. The psychic benefit gained from a rob-
bery might include pleasure derived from the use of force,30 the idi-
osyncratic value of a unique converted good, the satisfaction of
breaking or evading the law, or revenge if the victim and offender
have had a past association.31 The psychic benefit associated with
an offense can also be a psychic penalty deterring the commission of
a crime. Although some may benefit from breaking the law, others
may feel guilt. Victims who are past associates may be friends rather
than enemies. Therefore, an indeterminacy of values for psychic
variables exists. Also, the combination of pecuniary and psychic
benefits may be so high that no sanction, however certain, will deter
the offender.
32
The private criminal actor who acts in rational self-interest will
weigh the costs and benefits of committing an offense. The cost to
the offender is a function of the levels of probability and magnitude
of sanctions set by society (M X Pi). If the benefit to the offender
outweighs the disutility of the sanction discounted by its probability,
then the individual will commit the offense. Thus, an offender will
commit an offense when
B X Po _Mg X P,
where B is the private benefit the offender derives from completing
the act. The trick is for society to structure a set of sanction magni-
29 The quantifiable benefits of the offense can be objectively determined. The thief
who steals the paste believing it to be a genuine diamond has a low quantifiable benefit.
His subjective valuation is understood better as a psychic benefit in the thief's utility
calculation.
30 See R. POSNER, supra at 202.
31 Psychic benefits are notoriously difficult to quantify, but play an indispensable role
in our criminal justice system. Motive and mens rea may be understood as types of
psychic benefits and penalties. The offender's subjective assessment of the offense may
indicate his mens rea, and corroborating evidence of idiosyncratic benefits attendant to
the crime may establish motive.
32 Crimes of passion may not be capable of deterrence. Retaliatory crimes associated
with high psychic benefits are not deterred by our highest sanctions.
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tudes and probabilities, constrained by the costs they impose,3 3 that
deters the greatest number of offenses. This optimal structure of
criminal penalties marks the efficient level of both sanctions and
criminal activity.
The expected private benefit of an offense is the actual benefit
of the completed crime discounted by the probability of success.
So, for example, the private benefit of robbing Fort Knox is the ac-
tual benefit, if successful, less the probability of failure. Usually, the
discount for private benefit is merged into the analysis of private
cost associated with the offense. The merged variables are the
probability of failure from the expected benefit calculation (1 - Po),
and the probability of harm from the expected private cost calcula-
tion (Pi). Where an offender's success is controlled by the likelihood
of being apprehended, the cost/benefit accounting is unaffected by
the merger. But for those offenses which are controlled not by the
probability of apprehension but by the probability of failure,34 the
discount variables must be kept discrete.
If criminal actors will not commit offenses when their expected
benefits (pecuniary and psychic) are eclipsed by their expected costs
(probability and magnitude of sanctions), then sanctions which re-
spond only to changes in social harm are inefficient. Such sanctions
produce the optimal amount of deterrence accidentally, where the
offender's disutility coincides with social harm. Where these two
utilities are discontinuous, such sanctions will either under- or over-
deter.3 5
In sum, the social cost of crime is imposed from two sources:
33 This is the cost of appreciating marginal deterrence. This cost is binding when
society desires to limit expenditures on crime by the harm it imposes directly, and by the
harm generated by the incentive effects of stiffer penalties (i.e., engaging in more harm-
ful activities).
34 Imagine a complex computer fraud scheme that is masked well enough so that it is
impossible to trace. The success of this crime relies on a large number of variables
which are difficult to control. The decision to commit this crime requires discounting
the private benefits of a successful scheme by the probability of its failure, making the
crime less attractive. Furthermore, the relatively small chance of being apprehended
lowers the offender's expected private cost, making the crime more attractive.
35 A sanction will over-deter when the private benefit to the offender is less than the
social harm associated with the offense. Imagine that death is the penalty for negligent
homicide. The benefit to the offender (which might be a savings on precaution costs) is
much less than the social harm. A severe penalty reflecting that harm will deter all ac-
tors for whom the penalty exceeds the benefit. But a severe penalty also causes many
actors who fear their own fallibility to substitute away from socially beneficial activities
(e.g. surgery) that risk such penalties. If instead the penalty were set at the outer bounds
of the actor's private benefit from committing the offense, all who are capable of being
deterred will be, without the added social cost of over-imprisonment and erroneous con-
victions. A sanction will under-deter where the levels of private benefit and social harm
above are reversed, and the penalty reflects social harm.
406 [Vol. 8 1
CRIMINAL A TTEMPT
expected social harm and expected social expenditure. The former
variable reflects actual harm discounted by the probability of its oc-
currence (H X Po). The latter variable reflects the costs of appre-
hension and incarceration (C). Similarly, the private utility of crime
for the offender is imposed from two sources: expected private ben-
efit and expected private cost. The former variable reflects the ac-
tual benefit received from committing the crime (both pecuniary
and psychic) discounted by the probability of its attainment (B X
Po). The latter variable reflects the actual sanction imposed dis-
counted by the probability of its imposition (M X Pi).
Optimal sanctions involve the minimization of social cost in de-
terring criminal actors whose prospective benefits are less than the
probable social harm from the act. Because the expected private
benefit of an offense decreases as the probability and magnitude of
sanctions increase, criminal actors who would impose more harm
than their gain will be deterred. Deterrence thus occurs when the
probabilities and magnitudes of sanction are less than the social cost
of the crime, because the actor's expected benefit is driven below his
expected harm. Described algebraically, criminal sanctions will effi-
ciently deter offenders where
B XP. < MX P.(HXPo) + C.36
III. SANCTIONS AND CRIMINAL ATrEMPTS
Criminal attempts are punishable traditionally under both the
common law and the Model Penal Code.37 The severity and timing
of the sanctioning of an attempt are, however, debatable. Punishing
attempts as severely as completed offenses incurs high social costs
and ignores the potential reductions in harm due to marginal deter-
rence. The role of marginal deterrence is particularly appropriate
in discussions of criminal attempts.
Three methods of sanctioning attempts exist: the same sanc-
36 This statement may be summarized in the following steps:
1) M X Pi [there is a combination of magnitudes and
probabilities of sanctions for an offense]
2) C [whose social cost]
3) C < (H X P.) [is less than the social harm the offense imposes]
4) B X P. [which drives the offender's benefit]
5) B X P. < M X Pi [below his expected cost].
37 "[A]1I offenses of a public nature, that is, all such acts or attempts as tend to the
prejudice of the community, are indictable .. " Rex v. Higgins, 102 Eng. Rep. 269,
275 (1801). Section 5.05(1) of the Model Penal Code grades attempt to commit first
degree felony as a second degree felony and all other attempts as equivalent in grade to
the offense attempted. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (1962).
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tion,3 8 a lighter sanction,39 or no sanction at all. 40 Although society
prefers the middle option, the other options may highlight the seri-
ousness of limiting the preferred course of sanctions.4 1
Sanctioning attempts as if they were completed offenses implies
that they are equally harmful. An attempt may fail because it was
either executed poorly or averted by chance. Thus, the offender's
intentions often determine the act's potential harm. When an at-
tempt fortuitously fails, the potential for harm equals that of a com-
pleted offense. The calculating offender has "completed" the
rational portion of the crime, but the completion of the crime itself
was thwarted by supervening events. If sanctions respond to ra-
tional processes (incentives and disincentives), then non-calculated
events should not affect the severity of the sanction.42
An attempt interrupted by enforcement agencies may also fail.
In this scenario, equal punishment of attempted and completed
crimes is justified because only the social investment in enforcement
averted a criminal act. Because the decision to commit the crime
already has been made, the risk of social harm equals the completed
offense.
Abandoned attempts and interrupted attempts are often treated
differently. The former deserve less sanction than completed of-
fenses because the criminal voluntarily halted the progression of so-
cial harm by abandoning the pursuit of private benefit. The latter
deserve sanctions similar to completed offenses because the crimi-
nal is forced to give up the pursuit of benefit and the escalation of
social cost. While this distinction sits well with our moral intu-
itions,43 it fails to account for the offender's specific utility calcula-
38 See, e.g., id.
39 Many state legislatures have instituted lighter sanctions for attempts. See Grevase,
Grading Criminal Attempts-A Proposed Solution for Statutory Reform in Sentencing, 20 RUTGERS
L.J. 479, 481 n.12 (1989).
40 Early common law did not punish attempts as a separate offense. Rather, crimes
that fell short of their goal became offenses in their own right; assault (not requiring
contact), and larceny (not requiring a permanent deprivation of property) are common
examples. P. Low, R. BONNIES &J. JEFFERIES, CRIMINAL LAw, 341-42 (2d ed. 1986).
41 "Should [attempts] be punished as severely as the corresponding complete crime?
The answer of most legal theorists today is: yes .... Legal theory is seldom so out of
step with practice." Davis, Why Attempts Deserve Less Punishment than Complete Crimes, 5 LAw
AND PHIL. 1 (1986).
42 See, e.g., Becker, Criminal Attempts and the Theory of the Law of Crimes, 3 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 262 (1974) (arguing that the possible occurrence of supervening events is dis-
counted in the decision to commit the crime).
43 Such an intuition is captured in Kantian moral philosophy. Abandonment is the
equivalent of an autonomous, rule-directed activity, which an agent imposes upon him-
self, and whose consequences are his own responsibility. Interruption is a heterono-
mous rule, for which the agent is not responsible. Two attempts halted at the same
408 [Vol. 81
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tions. The offender who abandons the attempt rejects a more
harmful course of conduct because the gain in expected benefit
from continuing the attempt is offset by the expected harm of
sanctions.
The offender apprehended during an attempt also chooses be-
tween more and less harmful activity differently than the offender
who made the "moral" choice to abandon the attempt.44 When the
offender is near the completion of a crime and is interrupted, he
makes the final and important choice whether to pursue the offense
or acquiesce. If the penalty for the interrupted attempt is as severe
as that for the completed offense, then some offenders may evade or
resist arrest. The "shoot out problem" 45 indicates that because of-
fenders interrupted in attempts choose to impose more or less so-
cial harm, they need proper incentives to reduce social cost.
Two major obstacles exist to equating the sanctions for at-
tempts and completed offenses. First, failed attempts may indicate
that they were less harmful than a similar completed offense. If an
attempt is detected early, enough concomitant social harm to war-
rant the imposition of sanctions may not exist.46 Even if social harm
results, that the attempt was not completed may indicate the act was
less harmful than if completed.
47
Second, severe punishment for attempts imposes large social
costs. Costs of incarceration increase as longer sentences are im-
posed. Although fewer offenders will initiate attempts, those who
do will lose less by completing the crime. This effect raises marginal
deterrence, which directs the incentives of actors to move from
stage would have two different moral bases. The abandoned attempt is a moral act be-
cause it was the result of the agent's choice. The interrupted attempt is not a moral act
because the agent has no responsibility for its occurrence. See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1978).
44 The moral intuition errs in requiring pure autonomous decision-making. The in-
terrupted attempt is heteronomous- but also incorporates an autonomous decision-mak-
ing event which can be manipulated through legal incentives. See supra note 40.
45 The shoot-out problem refers to the portion of the interrupted attempt that re-
mains within the offender's control. To resist apprehension or to acquiesce is a decision
with both private and social welfare consequences. Inducing the interrupted offender to
acquiesce converts the interruption into an abandonment (albeit of a lower order than
an uninterrupted abandonment). Nevertheless, an abandonment and an acquiescence
result in the substitution of lower for higher cost behavior, and so must be preferred by
the legal system.
46 The Model Penal Code, for example, requires an actus reus in addition to mens rea
for the imposition of sanctions. The mental preparation of a crime before an act in
furtherance of the crime has been committed are not punished. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.01 (1962).
47 See Grevase, Grading Criminal Attempts-A Proposed Solution for Statutory Reform in Sen-
tencihg, 20 RUTGERS LJ. 479, 496 (1989).
1990] 409
SAMUEL KRAMER
more to less harmful activities. Unfortunately, this loss of marginal
deterrence may induce persons on the margin to refrain from so-
cially beneficial behavior for fear of severe sanctions.
Marginal deterrence also refutes the option of not punishing
attempts. Although the no-sanction option draws from the ideas
that social harm is low and error costs are high, the offender lacks
incentives to abandon an initiated attempt. The absence of sanc-
tions is a missed opportunity for society to add disincentives to the
initiation of attempts and incentives to impose less social harm.
Both the same-sanction and no-sanction solutions fail to ac-
count for marginal decisions. The decision to commit the crime de-
termines both the social harm and expenditure of the offense and
the sanction to be imposed. Because incentives surface within the
commission of an offense and the utilities of society and the of-
fender are recalculated continuously, more precise and efficient
sanctions can be fashioned.
Grading sanctions less severely for attempts than completed of-
fenses recognizes marginal deterrence. The goal of graded sanc-
tions for attempts is minimizing social cost by moving offenders
from more to less harmful activities. Creating disincentives and/or
incentives for offenders through the magnitude and probability of
sanctions achieves this goal. The method of grading is unclear.
Sanctions can reflect changes in either expected social cost during
the attempt or expected private benefit of the offender.
An example demonstrates the fluctuations in expected social
cost and expected private benefit. To ease the complexity of the
model of crime and punishment, the example is of a burglary of fun-
gible goods, which accentuates the pecuniary gains and losses asso-
ciated with the offense. Examining a hypothetical offense may
reveal the optimal level of sanctions for the reduction of social cost.
The premises to be burgled contain $100,000 locked in a safe.
In stage one of the attempted burglary, the offender acquires lock-
smith instruments, a stethoscope, a gun, and other tools of the bur-
glary trade. Properly equipped, the putative burglar completes
stage two by picking the lock of the premises and gaining access.
The offender ends stage three by locating the safe and deftly crack-
ing the combination. In stage four, the burglar gathers the loot and
escapes, completing the crime.
Assume that the burglar failed in his attempt after stage one,
but before undertaking stage two. He has lowered his expectations
of succeeding because he has either learned that his target installed
a very sophisticated security system or was intercepted by the police.
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Recall the factors that enter into the utility calculation. First, the
expected social harm, which is the magnitude of harm discounted by
its likelihood, is relatively low. Possessing burglary tools is less
harmful than completing a burglary. Second, the expected social
expenditure, the sanction magnitude discounted by the likelihood of
imposition, would be great. Detecting preparatory stages of of-
fenses is difficult and labor intensive.
At stage one, expenditures are high relative to harm because
the social cost of sanctioning stage one attempts is high while social
harm is low (which is society's incentive to deter). Society imposes
sanctions (magnitude and probability) only where their cost is less
than the social harm imposed. A rational society will have a rela-
tively light penalty for stage one attempts.
Now assume that the burglar completed stage one and is in the
middle of stage two, breaking into the premises. He either cannot
pick the lock or is detected. Here, social harm increases with the
escalation of the probability of harm. Society can afford larger ex-
penditures than in stage one to compensate for the increased social
harm. Thus, the probability and magnitude of stage two sanctions
will be incrementally higher than stage one sanctions.
Now suppose that the offense terminates at stage three, crack-
ing the safe. Society sets sanctions reflecting its costs. Expected so-
cial harm increases because the likelihood of completion is closer to
unity. Therefore, a higher combination of magnitude and
probability of sanctions exists. The closer to completion, the larger
and more certain the sanction. At stage four the burglary is com-
pleted, and the appropriate sanction levels are adjusted so that the
social harm of the burglary justifies sanctions bounded by social ex-
penditure that, at least, offset social harm.
The social consequences of a completed burglary flushes out
the applicability of sanction theories. A graded structure of sanc-
tions, increasing incrementally with the social harm imposed by the
offense, means that the levels of sanctions reflect not only the rela-
tive severity of the offense, but also the severity at other stages of
the same offense. Assume that harm-related sanctions increase by
the same margin for each successive stage; thus, the penalty for
stage two is twice that of stage one, for stage three, three times stage
one, etc.
A calculation of the offender's private utility at each stage of the
hypothetical burglary reveals that sanction grading minimizes both
expected benefit (benefit discounted by probability of success) and
expected harm (magnitude of sanction discounted by probability of
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imposition). Although the offender lacks incentives not to initiate
the offense, he equally lacks incentives to initiate it. At stage two,
the expected benefit slightly increases, resulting from the increase
in probability of success. The benefit at stage two is the same as
stage one; the increased likelihood of success (the second stage is
closer to the actual benefit than the first) is offset by the expected
harm (an increased likelihood of apprehension and magnitude of
sanction).
At the third stage of the attempted burglary, the benefit re-
mains unchanged, but the probability of success increases. This in-
creased probability is again limited by the increase in the probability
of suffering sanctions. But, the magnitude of these sanctions in-
creases. At stage four (when the burglary is completed), a discontin-
uous jump occurs in the private benefit, and the probability of
suffering sanctions lessens.
The sharp increase in private benefit from stage three to stage
four gives the offender a powerful incentive to complete the at-
tempted crime. The savings in expected private harm from aban-
doning an attempt would have to reflect the increase in private
benefit to induce the offender to abandon an attempt upon comple-
tion of stage three.
To compensate for this discontinuous increase in private bene-
fit, society must greatly increase expected private harm. Raising the
magnitude of sanction remains the only variable available to deter
completion. But, large rises in magnitude of sanctions lessens the
benefits of marginal deterrence by moving offenses into the class of
more highly sanctioned activities. For example, if the discontinui-
ties of private benefit from completed burglaries require an increase
in magnitude of their sanction, then the completed burglary may be
sanctioned as severely as, say, assault with a deadly weapon. Such
action merely postpones the problem of social harm because a puta-
tive burglar will assault anyone who intrudes during the commission
of the offense.
The value of marginal deterrence cannot be preserved by
greatly increasing the magnitude of sanctions for a completed of-
fense. The expected harm from completing offenses must mirror
the expected benefit for offenders to realize a savings by aban-
doning attempts. If the structure of sanctions rationally induces of-
fenders to complete offenses, then the sanctions are inefficient. In
this instance, incrementally increasing sanctions apparently pro-
vides such an inducement because the option of increasing the mag-
nitude of sanctions has an upper limit.
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IV. MARGINAL DETERRENCE AND SANCTIONING ATrEMPTS
Sanctions reflecting social cost produce a rising continuum of
penalties for offenders. As shown above, these sanctions inhibit the
benefits of marginal deterrence when attempts are near completion,
insofar as offenders are induced at stage three to complete the of-
fense rather than suffer the penalty for the attempt. Structuring
sanctions to parallel the offender's private benefit reduces social
cost.
To counter the discontinuous increase in private benefit from
stage three to stage four, the harm expected must also be high rela-
tive to stage three sanctions. Because the sanction structure has an up-
per bound, a discontinuous benefit for an offender to abandon an
attempt requires the reduction of sanctions for substantially com-
pleted attempts. While this is counter-intuitive because it is not
geared to social harm, this theory efficiently incorporates both social
cost and expected benefit.
In the hypothetical burglary, social harm is high relative to the
expected private benefit. Society must induce the offender to aban-
don the crime when he is so close to a large jump in private benefit.
A low sanction at stage three and a discontinuously high sanction at
stage four provide the proper incentives for offenders. As social
harm is high while both magnitudes and probabilities of sanctions
are bounded by social cost concerns, such criminal incentives ap-
pear as the only alternative.
The incentive solution to sanctioning attempts does not merely
invert the problem of bounded sanctions. While providing an in-
centive to abandon very harmful activities, it may be argued that in-
centive-based sanctions also provide the incentive to initiate
offenses because low stage three sanctions imply even lower stage
two sanctions, etc. A loss in initial deterrence offsets the savings in
marginal deterrence.
If incentive-related sanctions imply ever-lowering punishments
for attempts close to initiation of the offense, then the inversion crit-
icism would be credible. The incentive solution would parallel the
social harm-related sanction scheme with much of the bite taken out
of the magnitude of sanctions. But, such a deceleration of sanctions
for attempts need not regress toward initiation. To the contrary,
the offender has less expected benefit to bargain for, and society has
less social cost to worry about avoiding. For example, at stage two
of the hypothetical burglary, the offender can either abandon the
attempt and suffer stage two consequences or proceed to stage
three. This decision involves the utility calculations associated with
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each option. The offender does not benefit greatly by moving from
stage two to stage three (unlike the move from stages three to four);
nor is society harmed greatly by this move.
If the penalty for stage two were slightly higher than the penalty
for stage three, then some offenders at the margin will move from
stage two to stage three, where the punishment is comparatively less
severe. But, many offenders will be disinclined to attempt stage two
because an abandoned attempt will yield a sanction high relative to
the benefit. If the penalty for initiating an attempt, stage one, is
higher relative to stage two penalties, then the same effect would
occur. Although some margin of offenders will be induced by the
downward scale of punishment to progress in attempt stages, more
potential offenders will not even initiate the attempt.
The parabolic scheme of sanctions outlined above places the
rational inducements to commit offenses in the middle of the of-
fense where the acts induced impose the least harm. High penalties
for initiating attempts at the outset deter offenders who may not be
dissuaded by penalties at the lowest end of the spectrum. 48 The
perverse incentives that arise in escalating sanctions between at-
tempts and completions are neutralized when they likely produce
the least increase in social cost. Where attempts need only oie deci-
sion to become completed crimes, low sanctions can best exploit the
savings of marginal deterrence by making abandonment more at-
tractive relative to completion of the offense.
V. CONCLUSION: THE CRIMINAL ECONOMY AND SANCTIONS AS
PRICES
Incentive-based sanctions that reflect shifts in the offender's
private benefit, rather than social harm, propose supply-side an-
swers to the market question of the optimal level of criminal sanc-
tions. Offenders "supply" offenses where their expected private
benefit exceeds their expected private cost. Society's "demand" for
offenses is negative; it is willing to pay a price to prevent the supply
of offenses. Society would prefer no offense to be committed, but is
unwilling to pay for a zero level of criminal activity. Therefore, the
48 In a traditional graded sanction scheme, the lightest penalties are imposed for the
earliest stages of the offense. These low sanctions will not deter those actors on the
margin of receiving a net benefit from initiating an attempt. Incentive-based sanctions
for the initial stage of an attempt may be lower, as high, or higher than stage two sanc-
tions; but the initial stage sanction will be higher relative to the private benefit than will
stage two sanctions. Thus, incentive-based sanctions may slope downward, but they are
proportionally more severe at the initiation and completion of an offense than they are
in the midst of an offense.
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most efficient sanctions will deter the most criminal activity per dol-
lar of social cost.
Incentive-based sanctions appear to be a price for permission to
commit an offense.49 The offender's private benefit (how much he
values the offense) is structured to be less than his private cost (the
price of the offense) so long as the price does not exceed the social
cost of the offense. Offenders whose expected benefit exceeds the
social cost of the offense pay the price for the offense by suffering
sanctions because they value the offense above its cost.
Contrary to appearances,, incentive-based sanctions are not
prices for permission to commit offenses, but are incentives to re-
frain from doing what is forbidden. Traditional graded sanctions
that reflect shifts in social harm price offenses. Those sanctions re-
quire an offender to internalize the external social harm he imposes;
as long as the offender pays for the social harm his act imposes,
traditional sanctions do no more than exact that price. Thus, of-
fenders whose private benefit does not parallel social harm will com-
mit offenses capable of being deterred when there is a marginal
benefit to committing the offense exceeding the social harm
imposed.
Sanctions that reflect shifts in the offender's private benefit are
largely independent of social harm. Incentive-based sanctions do
not require the internalization of externalities imposed by the of-
fense. Rather, these sanctions serve as directives to keep the of-
fender's private benefit below his private cost. Where prices permit
offenses to be committed as long as they are paid for (social harm is
internalized), incentives make offenses undesirable to purchase. In-
centive-based sanctions are penalties threatened for committing of-
fenses which are rarely worthwhile for the offender. 50
49 The distinction between prices for permitted behavior and sanctions for forbidden
behavior is developed in Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1523 (1984).
Cooter devises a test for distinguishing priced from sanctioned behavior by legislative
access to information about the external costs and the socially desirable level of an activ-
ity. When lawmakers know the socially desirable level of an activity but not the external
costs it imposes, sanctions are preferable to prices, and vice-versa. The importance of
the distinction is that priced behavior internalizes harm, while sanctions motivate so-
cially desirable behavior.
50 Pricing sanctions to internalize harm is reminiscent of Coase's treatment of entitle-
ments. The Coase theorem would predict that in the absence of transaction costs, the
efficient level of activity would be reached no matter which party is granted the legal
entitlement. If the victim has the entitlement, then the offender would be willing to pay
the victim to commit the offense up to the price of the offense. When sanctions price
offenses to internalize harm, then offenders pay the price in the form of sanctions to
commit the crime. If the offender has the initial entitlement, the victim will bribe the
offender not to commit the offense up to the cost of the harm the act imposes. In either
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Sanctions for attempts may be in the form of prices or penal-
ties. Sanctioning attempts in the same way as the traditional grad-
ing scheme prices initial attempts low, according to the social harm
imposed. A late stage attempt would be priced high reflecting the
increased social harm. Offenders who can afford initial prices will
attempt the offense until their private benefit is reduced below their
private cost. Because sanctions for initial attempts are low, a mod-
est private benefit for the offender would make the attempt worth
the price. At a late stage in the attempt, the price is high relative to
the private benefit and is not worthwhile. Although an offender
would not initiate a late stage attempt, an offender at this stage
would be marginally better off by completing the offense rather than
abandoning it. The offender pays a higher price relative to his ben-
efit at stage three than upon completion.
Penalizing as opposed to pricing attempts allows the sanction to
deter the offense independently of social harm. Initial attempts may
be "priced" 5' above social harm, because these sanctions are
bounded by social cost, which exceeds social harm. Late stage at-
tempts may be "priced" well below social harm in order to make
completion less desirable than abandonment. The limitation of so-
cial harm upon pricing sanctions fails to deter those offenders
whose private benefit exceeds social harm but not social cost. In-
centive-based sanctions deter offenders whose private benefit is less
than the social cost of the offense, without inducing offenders to
substitute more harmful activities. Both traditionally graded sanc-
tions and incentive-based sanctions will deter a large number of of-
fenders from attempting offenses, and fail to deter a small number
of offenders from completing offenses. Under either scheme, the
private costs of committing offenses are usually high enough to de-
ter most people from committing offenses. Likewise, there will be a
small number of offenders whose private benefit exceeds social cost,
and will be undeterred by sanctions. The crucial difference between
traditionally graded and incentive-based sanctions applies to offend-
case, offenses valued above the harm they impose will fail to be deterred. See R. Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 LAW AND ECON. 1 (1960).
Incentive-based sanctions will deter those offenders whose expected benefit is less
than the social cost the offense imposes. Thus, offenses will be deterred independently
of whether social harm is internalized.
51 The "price" imposed by incentive-based sanctions differs from that of traditional
grading schemes. In the latter, the price of the offense is the harm that the offense
imposes; an offender who internalizes this cost (who values the offense more than the
harm it imposes) pays the price for committing the offense. The former scheme, on the
other hand, arranges the "price" of the offense so that no offender is willing to pay it,
unless his benefit exceeds the offense's social cost. The price that no offender is willing
to pay (except those unable to be deterred) is a penalty to prevent the forbidden.
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ers within this margin, whose private benefit lies between social
harm and social cost. Rather than pricing offenses to internalize ex-
ternal social cost, incentive-based sanctions provide incentives to
move to less harmful activities.
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